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BREARD, PRINTZ, AND THE
TREATY POWER
CARLOS MANuEL VAzQUEZ*

Virginia's execution of Angel Breard last year, with the
blessing of the United States Supreme Court1 but in the teeth
of an order of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")2 and a
request of the United States Secretary of State, 3 raised a
number of important questions concerning the distribution of
powers and responsibilities among the state and federal
governments in the area of foreign affairs. 4 This article·
addresses an issue that could have been raised in the Breard
litigation but was not: whether the treaty provision Virginia
violated contravenes the anticommandeering principle
articulated in Printz v. United States 5 and New York v. United
States. 6 If the treaty provision did attempt to commandeer
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to
David Bederman, Curtis Bradley, Viet Dinh, Vicki Jackson, and Mark Tushnet for
comments on an earlier version, and to Matthew Hsu for research assistance.
1. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per curiam); see also
Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1016 (1999); Stewart v.
LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. 1018 (1999).
2. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para.
v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. No. 99 (Apr. 9), reprinted in 37 I.LM. 810, 819 (1998),
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlipaus/ipausframe.htm>; see
also Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v.
U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. No. 103 (Mar. 3, 1999), available at <http://www.icjcij.org/ich www/idocketligus/igusframe.htm>.
3. See Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to James
S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998), quoted in Jonathan I.
Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666,
671-72 (1998).
4. I have addressed some of these issues elsewhere. See Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders of
Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998) [hereinafter Vazquez, Breard
and the Federal Power]; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene,
Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in
Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Vazquez, Night
and Day].
5. 521 u.s. 898 (1997).
6. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). It is unclear why this issue was not raised in the
Breard litigation. Although Printz was decided after the Breard litigation
commenced, see Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd,
134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352
(1998); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd,
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352
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Virginia's officials within the meaning of those cases, the
question arises whether the anticommandeering principle
applies to exercises of the treaty power as well as exercises of
the legislative power. Some commentators have suggested that
the rule of Printz and New York is not applicable to the treaty
power, 7 but others disagree. 8
Angel Breard, a national of Paraguay, challenged his
sentence on the ground that Virginia had violated the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (''Vienna Convention" or
"Convention"),9 a treaty to which the United States and
Paraguay are both parties. The Vienna Convention provides in
pertinent part that a national of one country "arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or ... detained
in any other manner" by the authorities of another country
has the right to confer with the consul of his country, if he
so requests, and that "said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this
[provision]." 10
The treaty thus required the Virginia
authorities who arrested Breard to inform him that he had a
right to consult with his consul, something Virginia did not do.
This provision appears prima facie to commandeer state
officers in contravention of Printz. 11
A closer examination, however, reveals that the question
whether the Vienna Convention's consular notification

(1998), the anticommandeering principle as articulated in New York at least
arguably prohibited federal commandeering of state executive officials. Perhaps
Virginia's lawyers concluded that Printz did not apply to exercises of the treaty
power or that the Vienna Convention did not "commandeer" in violation of New
York and Printz. Perhaps they overlooked the argument.
7. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENTARY 33, 52 (1997); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1260 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Curtis A Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 409 (1998); James A Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for
Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place
Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United
States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1998). See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 467 n.75 (2d ed. 1996) (New
York limits "presumably" apply to exercises of the treaty power).
9. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261.
10. Id. art. 36(1).
11. See Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law?
Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726, 1746 (1998).
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provision commandeers is quite complex. The complexity
results from two ambiguities in the Court's anticommandeering
doctrine.
First, the Court in New York and Printz
distinguished laws that commandeer from laws that merely
"encourage," and it made clear that the latter are not barred.
There is some question, however, where the line between
commandeering and encouragement falls. Second, the Court in
New York and Printz did not call into question Congress's
power to preempt state law, yet the decisions leave uncertain
where the line falls between unconstitutional commandeering
and valid preemption.
Determining whether the Vienna Convention's consular
notification provision commandeers requires an examination of
both of these ambiguities. One of the categories of laws the
Court in New York found to be valid. "encouragement" consists
of laws that "conditionally preempt" state law-that is, laws
that give the states a choice between agreeing to do something
that would otherwise constitute commandeering and
submitting to a valid federal law preempting state law. 12 The
consular notification provision could be viewed as valid
conditional preemption on the theory that it gives the states a
choice between giving aliens the notification contemplated by
the Convention and refraining from arresting nationals of
countries that are parties to the Convention. The provision
would constitute valid conditional preemption, however, only if
a law or treaty barring states from arresting such persons
would be valid. In light of Missouri v. Holland, 13 a treaty
barring the arrest of nationals of certain countries would not
violate any subject-matter limitation on the treaty power
deriving from the Tenth Amendment, as the Court in that case
held that there were no such limitations. There is some basis,
however, for concluding that such a treaty would violate the
anticommandeering principle itself.
The answer to the broader question addressed by this
article-whether the anticommandeering principle applies to
the treaty power-similarly depends on the resolution of the
two ambiguities identified above. If commandeering were
defined broadly, as distinguished from both· encouragement
and preemption, then the anticommandeering principle could

12. See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68.
13. 252 u.s. 416 (1920).

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1319 1999

1320

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

not plausibly be considered applicable to exercises of the treaty
power, as it would condemn numerous treaties that the
Supreme Court has upheld. The broad interpretation of this
principle, however, seems implausible even in the nontreaty
context.
On the other hand, applying a narrower
interpretation of the anticommandeering principle to the treaty
power would pose no special problems, and in some respects
has considerable appeal.
Part I of this article explains why a federal law requiring
state officers to provide a notification to private parties under
certain circumstances appears prima facie to violate the anticommandeering principle, but suggests that the Vienna
Convent~on's consular notification provision may be valid
conditional preemption because it leaves the states the option
of refraining from arresting the relevant aliens. My analysis of
conditional preemption, however, exposes this technique as a
cheap and easy way for the federal government to evade the
anticommandeering principle.
For example, the statute
invalidated in Printz itself could be upheld as conditional
preemption with only seemingly trivial modifications. Part I
considers possible constraints on Congress's use of conditional
preemption in the purely domestic, nontreaty context, but
concludes that the constraints are weak.
Part II explains that conditional preemption is even less of
a constraint on the federal government in the treaty context
because, under Missouri v. Holland, there are no subjectmatter limits on the treaty power having their source in the
Tenth Amendment. Thus, even if the anticommandeering
principle applied to exercises of the treaty power, Congress
would retain an even broader capacity than in· the nontreaty
context to "encourage" states by threatening preemption. Part
II considers and rejects various proposals to limit the
substantive scope of the treaty power in the name of state
sovereignty.
In both the treaty and nontreaty contexts, the breadth of
the conditional preemption doctrine depends on where the line
falls between invalid commandeering and valid preemption.
For example, the consular notification provision is valid
conditional preemption only if a hypothetical treaty barring the
arrest of aliens would be valid preemption. Part III examines
the plausibility of broad interpretations of Printz and New York
adopted by two federal courts of appeals, either of which would
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condemn such a hypothetical treaty. The Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits have read those decisions to bar federal laws that
impose regulations on states without imposing the same
regulations on private individuals/4 the Seventh Circuit has
read them to bar federal regulations that regulate the states
"in their role as governments." 15 Applying either of those
interpretations to the treaty power would be highly problematic. Like the Constitution, but unlike statutes, treaties
typically govern "state action." When the United States
accepts an obligation by treaty, therefore, the obligation
typically applies to the actions of the federal and state
governments, but not to private conduct. The broad interpretations of the anticommandeering principle adopted by these
courts would therefore represent a serious limitation on the
treaty power. They also conflict with a number of Supreme
Court decisions upholding treaties and statutes that would be
invalid under those interpretations. I conclude that those
broad interpretations of Printz, implausible even outside the
treaty context, in any event should not apply to exercises of the
treaty power.
In Part IV, I argue that there is little reason for exempting
the treaty power from the anticommandeering principle if that
principle were understood narrowly to encompass only the sort
of directives involved in the Printz and New York cases. In
light of the limitations and exceptions recognized in New York
and Printz, the federal government retains significant options
short of commandeering for inducing action by state officials
where state officials are better situated than federal officials to
do what the treaty contemplates. Perhaps ironically, one of the
effects of applying the anticommandeering principle to the
treaty power would be to call into question an "understanding''
the United States has attached to recent human rights treaties,
purportedly in the interest of state sovereignty. This sort of
irony, however, pervades the Supreme Court's doctrine in this
area. In my view, the fact that it calls these understandings
into question gives considerable appeal to applying the narrow

14. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. Apr. 6,
1999); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, Mar.
15, 1999 (No. 98-1464).
15. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998).
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interpretation of the anticommandeering principle to exercises
of the treaty power.
I.

COMMANDEERING VS. ENCOURAGEMENT

A. What It Would Mean to Invalidate the Consular
·Notification Provision Under Printz

When Angel Breard challenged his death sentence on the
ground that Virginia officials failed to notify him of his right to
consult with his consul, Virginia responded by arguing, among
other things, that Breard had forfeited this claim by failing to
raise it at trial and that vacatur of a conviction is not a remedy
authorized by the Convention. 16 The State did not argue,
however, that the obligation to notify Breard of his right to
consult with his consul was an unconstitutional
commandeering of state officials by the federal government. At
the time Virginia first responded to Breard's Vienna
Convention claims, Virginia officials may not have understood
that the Constitution prohibited commandeering of state
executive officials, 17 but the Supreme Court in Printz
subsequently made it clear that it does. The Court in Printz
also made it clear that the Constitution prohibits
commandeering even if the burden on the states, financial or
otherwise, is de minimis .18 If the issue were to arise again,
therefore, the validity of the consular notification provision
could legitimately be raised. 19
16. See Vazquez, Night and Day, supra note 4, at 52-53.
17. See supra note 6.
18. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 931-33 (1997).
19. In Breard, and later in Stewart v. LaGrand, 119 S. Ct. 1018 (1999), the
Court denied relief on the ground that the alien invoking the Vienna Convention
had forfeited his claim by failing to raise it at the appropriate time. The Printz
issue would be squarely raised, however, if an alien denied the required
notification were to raise the issue at the proper time and satisfy other threshold
requirements. Cf United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, No. 98-50347, 1999 WL
160848 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1999) (finding that, upon a showing of prejudice,
violation by federal officials of Vienna Convention right to consular notification
can constitute ground for suppressing statements subsequently given).
The Vienna Convention is not the only treaty that purports to impose
obligations on state officials of this nature. For example, the Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons provides that "[a]ny sentenced person to whom this
Convention may apply shall be informed by the sentencing State of the substance
of this Convention." Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced
Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, art. 4(1), 35 U.S.T. 2868, 2872, 22 I.L.M. 530, 531.
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Invalidating as unconstitutional commandeering the
requirement that state officials notify arrestees of their right to
consult with their consuls would in no way diminish the United
States' responsibility towards other parties under international
law. Printz would simply mean that, as a matter of domestic
law, state officials could not be required to provide the
notification. The result would be that the federal government
would have to provide the necessary notification when state
authorities arrested nationals of other states-parties to the
Vienna Convention. This would of course raise significant
practical difficulties for the federal government, not the least of
which would be to learn of the states' arrests of foreign
nationals. But the Court in Printz made it clear that federal
commandeering of state officials is invalid even if such
commandeering is clearly a more efficient means of
accomplishing the desired end than direct federal
enforcement. 20
The survival of the international obligation to notify
arrestees of their right to consult with their consuls, 21 however,

20. The Court in Printz did leave open the possibility that a federal law
requiring state officials to report certain information to the federal government
might not violate the anticommandeering principle. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932
n.l7; id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Because there does not seem to be a
principled distinction between this sort of obligation and others that clearly
violate Printz, some commentators have questioned this possible exception. See
Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 234-35. Without this exception, the federal government would
have a difficult time learning of the arrest of aliens triggering the consular
notification right. If the exception were recognized, on the other hand, the states
could not be obligated to provide the. notification to the arrestee, but they could be
required to notify the federal government of the arrest, permitting the latter in
turn to provide the notification to the arrestee-certainly a highly inefficient
result.
21. The Vienna Convention clearly contemplates that the notification be
given by the "authorities" who detained the alien. But if the Constitution
prohibits the imposition of that obligation on state executive officials, then surely
notification by federal officials would be preferable, from the point of view of the
treaty, than no notification at all. Indeed, it is likely that the parties to the treaty
were indifferent as to who does the notifying, as treaties do not generally address
the allocation of responsibilities among particular domestic authorities. The
language of the treaty no doubt reflects a recognition of the practical difficulties of
requiring notification by anyone other than the arresting authorities, rather than
a preference for notification by state as opposed to federal officials. But if these
practical difficulties could be overcome, surely no one would complain if the
notification were given by someone other than the arresting authorities. In other
words, the requirement that the notification be given is severable from the
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suggests another basis for upholding the requirement that
state officials provide the notification. The Convention could,
in theory, be satisfied even if neither state nor federal officials
ever notified any alien of a right to consult with his consul.
The Convention requires such notification only if such an alien
is "detained"; if no alien is detained, no notification is required.
Thus, a federal law prohibiting states from detaining aliens
from countries that are parties to the Vienna Convention
would, if valid, ensure compliance with the Convention. The
federal government has not passed such a law, but Congress's
power to pass such a law is relevant to the validity of the treaty
provision the federal government did enact. The remainder of
this part explains the relevance to our analysis of a
congressional power to ban altogether the arrests of aliens by
state officials. Parts II and III then consider whether the
federal government in fact possesses such a power.
B. The Consular Notification Provision as Conditional
Preemption

In New York u. United States, the Court struck down only
one of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Court held that Congress
could not compel or coerce the states into enacting or
administering a federal regulatory scheme, but it upheld two
provisions giving the states "incentives" short of compulsion.
First, it upheld a provision offering the states money in
exchange for their agreement to administer the federal
regulatory scheme, 22 deeming s~ch an offer mere
"encouragement."23 Second, and more importantly for present
purposes, it upheld a provision giving the states a choice
between administering the federal regulatory scheme and
having state law preempted by a valid federal law. 24 On the

requirement that it be given by the arresting authority, and thus the former
would survive if the latter were to fall.
22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173 (1992).
23. ld.
24. See id. at 174.
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other hand, the Court struck down the so-called take-title
provision, which transfe~ed title to certain radioactive waste
to the state if the state failed to administer the federal
regulatory scheme. 25 This provision, the Court held, gave the
states a choice between two options Congress could not
constitutionally have imposed separately. 26 Both options, the
Court said, constituted unconstitutional commandeering of
state officials. 27 The take-title provision accordingly, "crossed
the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."28
New York thus leaves the federal government the option of
inducing states to provide the required notification by offering
them money or threatening to withdraw money they are
already receiving. This sort of encouragement could be quite
effective, but it would still leave open the possibility that states
would refuse to comply and thus produce a treaty violation.
The second set of incentives suggests a more effective strategy.
Since the treaty would be complied with if no nationals of
states-parties were arrested by the states, if Congress lacked
the power directly to compel the states to provide the required
notification, it could enact a law prohibiting the states from
arresting persons who are nationals of such countries. If such
a law would be constitutional, then the New York Court's
reasons for upholding the second incentive suggest that
Congress could also give the states a choice between not
arresting such persons and arresting them but giving them the
required notification. Just as the second incentive in New York
was a valid "conditional exercise" of Congress's commerce

25. See id. at 177.
26. See id. at 175.
27. See id.
28. Id. The Court's apparent conclusion that a forced transfer of title to
waste is itself a violation of the anticommandeering principle has implications for
the scope of this principle. See infra text accompanying note 95. Alternatively,
one might view the Court's holding with respect to this provision as resting on the
idea that the transfer of title is a penalty for the states' refusal to administer the
federal regulatory scheme, and that it was by attaching a penalty to this refusal
that Congress had "crossed the line" distinguishing encouragement from coercion.
This would be consistent with the Court's practice in the Spending Clause area of
regarding the payment of federal funds as "encouragement" (and the threatened
withdrawal of such funds as merely the withdrawal of encouragement), while
regarding the threat of even a minor fine as coercion. See also infra note 37; infra
text accompanying notes 135-36.
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power, such a law would appear to be a valid "conditional
exercise" of the treaty power. 29
Indeed, enactment of a law giving the states the choice
between not arresting aliens and arresting but notifying aliens
would appear to be unnecessary, as the Vienna Convention
itself, properly read, gives the states precisely that choice. As
already noted, the treaty does not impose an unconditional
obligation to notify aliens of anything; rather, it requires that
aliens be notified of their right to consult with their consuls
only if such aliens are detained. By its very terms, therefore,
the treaty imposes a conditional obligation of the sort the New
York decision appears to permit. 30

29. Perhaps the validity of such a statute would depend on the feasibility of
requiring the federal government to provide the necessary notification. If the
federal government could provide the notification without much difficulty, then
one might say that a law prohibiting the states from arresting aliens is invalid as
an exercise of the treaty power because it is not sufficiently tailored to achieving
the legitimate end of securing compliance with the treaty. Assuming this sort of
limitation exists, it is easily met in the case of the Vienna Convention, as it is
infeasible for the federal government to provide the necessary notification when
state authorities arrest an alien. I note, moreover, that this sort of limitation
brings in through the back door an issue the Court in Printz regarded as
irrelevant-that is, the degree to which requiring the state officials to perform the
acts instead of federal officials would be easier or more efficient.
30. Another of the limitations of the anticommandeering principle
recognized in Printz and New York is that it prohibits only the commandeering of
nonjudicial state officers. This suggests another way for Congress to secure state
compliance with the consular notification provision: Congress could pass a law
requiring state judges to provide nationals of states-parties the required
notification and, if the notification had not previously been given and if the
defendant so requests, to stay the prosecution to give the defendant adequate time
to consult with his consul. Query whether the Court would strike down this
obligation because it requires state judges to perform an executive function. The
Printz decision suggests the Court would not strike the statute down, as the Court
distinguished early statutes imposing seemingly executive obligations on the
states on the ground that the obligations were imposed on state judges rather
than executive officers. On the other hand, the Constitution's failure to define
state "judges" or offer a basis for distinguishing them from state executive
officials, cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (defining federal judges as those having life
tenure and salary protection), appears to require that this exemption from the
anticommandeering principle turn on the nature of the activity required by
federal law. This is indeed the approach the Court has taken in the converse
situation. See Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928-29 (1997) (distinguishing
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), on the ground that the obligations the
federal statute imposed on state executive officials were adjudicatory in nature).
Alternatively, Congress might pass a statute requiring state judges to dismiss
indictments of nationals of states-parties unless the defendant had previously
been advised of his right to confer with his consul. Such a statute seems to me
more vulnerable than the one described above, since it more directly imposes the
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It might be objected that, if this analysis were correct,
Printz should have come out the other way. At issue in Printz
was the constitutionality of an interim provision of the Brady
Act requiring the "chief law enforcement officer" ("CLEO") of a
prospective gun purchaser's residence to conduct a background
check of the prospective gun purchaser. 31 The statute required
gun sellers to obtain certain information about the prospective
gun buyer and to provide that information to the CLE0. 32 It
also required the gun seller to wait five days before selling the
gun, and it prohibited him from selling the gun if the CLEO,
after performing the background check, informed him that the
prospective gun buyer was ineligible to buy it. 33 Could this
scheme be characterized as an exercise of conditional
preemption? By the terms of the statute, the obligation to
perform the background check was triggered by, and
conditioned on, an individual's request to purchase a gun, and
surely it is within Congress's commerce power to ban entirely
the sale of guns. 34
To be sure, Congress could have achieved its goals by
writing the Brady Act in such a way as to fit it wi~hin the

obligation to notify on state executive officials. The instruction to state judges to
dismiss indictments seems like a penalty for the state officials' failure to comply
with this obligation. The hypothetical statute described in the preceding
paragraph, on the other hand, would impose the notification requirement on state
judges. It should, however, "encourage" state executive officials who do not want
their prosecutions delayed to provide the required notification at an earlier stage.
Both of the foregoing statutes could be conceived as additional examples of
conditional preemption: they give the states the choice between providing the
notification and having their prosecutions either stayed or dismissed by a state
judge. Indeed, the consular notification provision as it currently stands, properly
construed, may offer state executive officials precisely that choice. See United
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, No. 98-50347, 1999 WL 160848 (9th Cir. Mar. 25,
1999). I regard the characterization of the consular notification provision offered
in the text, however, as a less controversial exercise of conditional preemption
than (at least) the second of the hypothetical statutes discussed in this footnote.
31. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Such a ban would appear to be within the commerce power, as
interpreted in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Under the standard
adopted in that case, Congress apparently may regulate anything that qualifies as
"commerce," and certainly the sale of guns does. I discuss this issue further
below. Of course, such a ban would be valid only if the Second Amendment does
not limit Congress's power to impose it. Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937-39 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (suggesting the Brady Act violated the Second Amendment).
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conditional preemption doctrine. A statute written along the
following lines should have survived scrutiny:
No gun shall be sold unless and until the prospective gun
seller provides the CLEO [certain information about the
prospective purchaser] and, within X days, the CLEO,
having conducted a background check according to [specified
standards], notifies the gun seller that the prospective
purchaser satisfies [specified requirements]. Any gun seller
who sells a gun without complying with this law shall be
subject to [specified sanctions].

Such a statute would not have unconditionally required state
officers to conduct background checks; it would merely have
provided that, unless they did, no gun could be sold. If a
federal ban on gun sales would be valid, this statute should
also be valid, as it merely offers state officers a choice between
conducting the background check and having their laws
permitting the sale of guns preempted by an otherwise valid
federal statute.
But the Brady Act did not merely give the officers such a
choice. As the Printz majority noted, the statute imposed
certain penalties on state officials who refused to perform
background checks. 35 In light of these penalties, the statute
could not be construed as merely giving the state officials a
choice between administering the federal regulatory scheme
and having their law preempted. 36 Printz thus does not
35. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
36. The statute did give the officers a choice between providing the
notification and paying a fine, but this choice is no more valid than the choice
between enforcing federal law and taking title to waste. Indeed, in both Printz
and New York, it may have been the existence of the sanction that rendered the
statute invalid, making it "coercion" and thus "commandeering" rather than mere
"encouragement." See infra note 37. But cf infra text accompanying notes 13536. The distinction between an invalid penalty and valid encouragement,
however, is not always straightforward. For example, as discussed supra note 30,
a law that requires state judges to dismiss indictments against an alien unless the
alien was provided the notification required by the Vienna Convention might be
said to impose a penalty for the failure to provide the notification. Like a fine, the
dismissal is triggered by the failure to provide the notification and is designed to
induce state executive officials to provide the notification. On the other hand,
every exercise of conditional preemption could be said to have the same
characteristics. New York requires that both options be valid if imposed
independently, and this appears to require that each option be defined without
reference to the other. In examining the validity of an exercise of conditional
preemption, therefore, the question must be whether the law (the one setting
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undermine the argument outlined above for fitting the consular
notification proVIsion within New York's rationale for
upholding the second incentive. 37

C. Possible Constraints on the Use of Conditional
Preemption
My rewrite of the Brady Act suggests that, even in the
purely domestic, nontreaty context, conditional preemption is a
relatively cheap and easy way around the anticommandeering
principle. While the federal government may not directly
require state officials to conduct background checks, it can
make the performance of a background check a condition of the

forth the consequences of refusing to enforce the federal directive) would be valid
if applied to all members of the relevant class, not just those who refuse to enforce
the federal directive. Thus, in New York, the Court asked whether a law
requiring all states to take title to waste would be valid. A law imposing a fine on
CLEOs who refuse to perform a background check would be valid as conditional
preemption only if a law requiring all CLEOs (and only CLEOs) to pay money to
the federal government (in the amount of the fine) would be valid. Printz
implicitly holds that it would not be. In examining the constitutionality of a
statute requiring the dismissal of indictments of aliens who do not receive the
notification required by the Vienna Convention, the relevant question would
appear to be whether a law requiring the dismissal of indictments of all aliens
would be valid. If so, then this hypothetical statute may in fact pose effectively
the same choice as a statute giving state officials the choice between giving the
notification and refraining from arresting aliens. If this is the analysis called for
by New York and Printz, then whether a statute "coerces" (that is, imposes a
sanction or penalty) or merely "encourages" turns on whether the other option
would be independently constitutional, rather than on the degree or intensity of
the inducing (or penalizing) it does.
37. If the presence of a personal sanction is ultimately what doomed the
Brady Act, then one might legitimately wonder why the Court did not just strike
down the penalty provision. Cf. Evan Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal
Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1057 (1995). But cf. infra text accompanying note
135 (suggesting that absence of a sanction may not be sufficient to save a statute).
On the other hand, one might interpret the Printz decision as having done just
that: without the penalty provision, the requirement that state officials conduct
background checks arguably becomes merely a request that they do so, and the
Court made it clear in Printz that the federal government may request the
assistance of state officials. See in particular Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, 521 U.S. at 936, making it clear that, even after Printz, state officials
remain free to conduct the background checks voluntarily. In any event, even if
the Vienna Convention were interpreted to impose a penalty on state officials who
arrest aliens without notifying them of their right to consult with their consuls (or
if section 1983 imposes a penalty on such officials), the provision should be upheld
because it gives the officials the third option of refraining from arresting aliens.
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states' continued ability to do something it wants to do, such as
permit the sale of guns in its territory. Commentators argue
that there are significant doctrinal, economic, and political
constraints on ·the . federal government's ability to use
conditional preemption to evade the anticommandeering
principle. The rewritten Brady Act, however, suggests that, in
certain contexts at least, the constraints are quite weak.
The constitutional limitations on the federal government's
legislative powers are obvious constraints on its ability to
evade Printz through conditional preemption. Conditional
preemption allows the federal government to "encourage"
states by giving them a choice between doing what they do not
want to do and being barred from doing something they do
want to do. The federal government thus extracts the states'
"voluntary'' consent by threatening them with preemption
through a law they would consider more onerous. But the more
onerous law has to be one that, if enacted separately, would
itself pass constitutional muster.
This does not appear to be a significant constraint,
however, even in the purely domestic, nontreaty context. (As
discussed below, it may be even less of a constraint in the
treaty context.) My conclusion that the hypothetical rewrite of
the Brady Act would be valid rests on the premise that a flat
ban on the sale of guns would be within the commerce power as
construed in United States v. Lopez. 38 Before Lopez, it had
widely been thought that the federal government's legislative
power under the Commerce Clause was, as a practical matter
at least, all but plenary. 39 Though Lopez showed that there
were some limits, even after Lopez, the commerce power
remains broad. 40 The precise ways in which Lopez modified
prior doctrine are a matter of some uncertainty, 41 but at any
rate it appears that the teeth the Court gave to the
constitutional limits in this area have bite only where the
subject matter regulated by the federal government is not
"economic" or "commercial."42 When the federal government
38. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
39. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 67475 (1995).
40. See id. at 712.
41. See generally id.
42. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion states the test thus: "Where
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
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regulates commercial or economic actiVity, the regulation
should be no more vulnerable after Lopez than before. If so,
then a federal statute banning the sale of guns would be valid,
as the sale of guns is quintessentially a commercial activity. 43
To the extent I have misread Lopez, of course, my
conclusions about the validity of a flat ban on gun sales could
be contested. If the test of whether an act of Congress falls
within the commerce power turned on the legitimacy of
Congress's purposes in enacting it,44 or on the true need for
federal legislation,45 the constitutionality of the hypothetical
rewrite of the Brady Act would be uncertain. The rewrite
would be valid as conditional preemption only if a flat ban on
gun sales, enacted separately, would be valid. But Congress
did not actually enact such a ban. How does one determine the
"purpose" of a hypothetical statute? Does one try to imagine a
hypothetical purpose that would be valid? A hypothetical
purpose test would have no bite. If one focuses on the statute
Congress actually enacted, on the other hand, the ban on gun
sales would be suspect under a purpose test, as Congress's
purpose in enacting it was at least in part to induce the states

that activity will be. sustained." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. The Court's innovation in
Lopez was to insert the term "economic" before "activity." Elsewhere, the majority
described the test as requiring "the determination whether an intrastate activity
is commercial or noncommercial." Id. at 566. Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion appears to treat the "commercial-ness" of the activity as a factor in a
sliding scale: the more commercial the activity regulated by a federal statute, the
more likely the statute is to be upheld as an exercise of the commerce power,
other factors being equal (the principal other factor being the extent to which the
activity has traditionally been regulated by the states). See id. at 569 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
43. See Merritt, supra note 39, at 719 ("Congressional regulation of the sale
or 'transfer' of machineguns after Lopez is uncontroversial; the sale of any article
is commercial activity."). Like Professor Merritt and all the Justices in Printz
except Justice Thomas, see supra note 34, I shall disregard possible Second
Amendment objections. Such objections would of course be irrelevant to statutes
or treaties addressing other matters.
44. Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Adjudication,
85 CAL. L. REV. 297 (1997) (noting. and approving increased use of purpose
scrutiny in other areas of constitutional law).
45. Professor Merritt has suggested that the Court's decision to strike down
the federal law in Lopez was influenced by "[t]he Government's failure to identify
an urgent national need to combat [the] problem" ostensibly addressed by the
statute Congress passed. Merritt, supra note 39, at 705. Professor Jackson has
proposed that the Court's current approach to federalism issues be replaced by a
sort of "necessity" review. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and
Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2234-37 (1998).
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to do something they could not be compelled to do directly. The
Court in New York, however, upheld the second incentive even
while recognizing that it was designed to "encourage" the
states to do what they could not be compelled to do, 46 a purpose
reflected in the very term "incentive."
A flat ban on gun sales would be similarly suspect under a
"need" test, as Congress's purposes could plainly have been
achieved through less intrusive means. But the flat ban on
guns was necessary precisely because Congress lacked the
power to compel the background checks directly, no matter how
great the need. An exercise of conditional preemption clearly
cannot be invalid just because Congress's goals could be
achieved less intrusively by constitutionally unavailable
means. Conditional preemption by its very nature relies on the
conditional imposition of a regime that Congress itself regards
as a second-best solution in order to induce states to adopt
voluntarily what Congress regards as the best solution.
Applying a "need" test in this context raises a number of
Indeed, the difficulty, if not the
difficult questions. 47
impossibility, of applying either a purpose test or need test to
an exercise of conditional preemption supports my conclusion
that Lopez does not embrace such a test. If the Court were to
embrace such a test in the future, it would have to rethink the
concept of conditional preemption.
If the Commerce Clause does not pose much of a doctrinal
limit to Congress's ability to employ conditional preemption,
are there other sorts of constraints? Professors Michael Dorf
and Charles Sabel, 48 and Professor Roderick Hills,49 have
suggested that economic considerations constrain Congress's

46. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152 (1992).
4 7. For example, does the court ask whether federal officials could plausibly
perform the background checks instead? Such an analysis conflicts with the
approach of the Printz Court, which regarded such a question as irrelevant. See
supra note 29. Does a "need" analysis inquire whether the preemption chosen by
Congress to induce the states' voluntary agreement was narrowly tailored to
achieve that result? Such an inquiry would require the Court to devise a test for
determining how much inducement is too much-a daunting task, to say the least.
48. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. 1. REV. 267, 425-26 (1998).
49. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICH. 1. REV. 813, 868 (1998).
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ability to engage in conditional preemption; 50 Specifically, they
note that a threat of preemption is credible only if Congress
stands ready to devote federal resources to regulate a given
matter itself in the event the states decline to do so. But, while
this constraint may be significant in certain contexts, it
appears to be negligible in others, as illustrated by my
hypothetical rewrite of the Brady Act. The actual Brady Act
imposed an obligation on state officials to perform background
checks and subjected those officials to penalties for
noncompliance. The rewrite encourages the state officials to
perform background checks by prohibiting private parties from
selling guns unless background checks have been performed by
such officials, and it subjects the gun sellers to penalties for
noncompliance. It is far from evident that achieving a given
level of compliance would cost the federal government more
under the latter scheme than under the former. Moreover,
Congress could devise alternative enforcement schemes that
would appear to be even less costly. For example, Congress
could ban the sale of guns in any state in which the legislature
has not enacted a law imposing severe state-enforced penalties
on state officers who do not conduct background checks. 51
Congress could even rely on private attorneys general to
enforce the ban on guns through qui tam actions; the portion of
the fine retained by the federal government under such a
scheme would offset any increased cost, which would in any
event be minimal or nonexistent under this scheme. Of course,
if the qui tam actions were maintained in federal courts, there
would be a cost allocable to the federal judiciary. But even this
cost could be minimized by giving exclusive jurisdiction to the
state courts, a sort of commandeering permitted by Printz. 52 In
short, Congress could dev1se inexpensive yet credible second-

50. See also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and
Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 289, 312
(1984).
51. ,Such a scheme should be easier for the federal government to enforce, as
gun shops would be altogether illegal in easily identifiable states. Alternatively,
or in addition, Congress could subject gun sellers who sell to people who have not
undergone a state-performed background check to damage liability to persons
injured by the guns they sell.
52. Under such a scheme, the cost allocable to the federal judiciary would
consist only of the resources expended by the Supreme Court in reviewing
certiorari petitions and deciding the few, if any, cases involving this statute that
the Court chooses to decide.
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best schemes that could be quite effective at inducing states to
agree to enforce Congress's preferred scheme. 53
Hills also suggests that conditional preemption can be
"politically costly."54 He does not describe political costs other
than the economic ones discussed above, but perhaps he or
others would say that there is likely to be substantially greater
political opposition to a flat ban on gun sales than to a law
requiring a five-day waiting period and a background check.
That is surely true, but the hypothetical rewrite of the Brady
Act does not flatly ·ban gun sales; it gives the states the choice
of performing background checks or having gun sales banned.
Because the rewritten statute does not require anything more
objectionable than a background check (if a background check
is regarded as the less objectionable option), a rational
constituent should be no more disposed to object to this statute
than to a statute that only requires background checks (and
that is the statute Congress in fact enacted). Admittedly, a
conditional ban on gun sales could disproportionately arouse
the gun lobby or give it the opportunity to mischaracterize a
legislator's vote in television commercials as a vote for a flat
ban. On the other hand, it should be possible to write a
conditional preemption statute in such a way as to make it
clear that Congress is not requiring-and does not prefer-the
more objectionable option. The rewritten Brady Act, for
example, merely provides that sales of guns shall be subject to
a five-day waiting period and a background check performed by
state officials. The only differences between the rewrite and
the actual Brady Act are that the penalty under the rewrite is
imposed on the gun seller instead of the state official, and that
state officers have the option not to perform background
checks.
These differences seem unlikely to generate
substantially more opposition.
Apparently recognizing that conditional preemption offers
a cheap and easy way around Printz, Hills in the end argues
that some exercises of conditional preemption would be invalid

53. Indeed, the "incentive" the Court upheld in New York as conditional
preemption relied entirely on enforcement by other states. The relevant provision
merely permitted states to exclude from their territory waste generated by states
that declined to adopt federally specified measures. (Without federal permission,
such exclusion would have violated the dormant Commerce Clause.) See infra
note 108.
54. Hills, supra note 49, at 868.
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under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This would
be the case, in his view, if "(1) the condition that the [state
officials] must meet would, if imposed unconditionally, be
unconstitutional, and (2) Congress threatened preemption of
[state] policy merely to gain leverage to extract compliance
with the condition. "55 On the surface, this test appears to
condemn all exercises of conditional preemption, but if so, it
clashes with New York's upholding of "incentives" avowedly
designed to "encourage" states to do what they could not be
directly' compelled to do. Hills's elaboration of the test,
however, suggests that it in fact places only a weak limit on the
availability of conditional preemption. Apparently, an exercise
of conditional preemption would be invalid only if the condition
"served no purpose except as a device by which to punish [the
state] for refusing to" do what Congress. wants but cannot
directly require it to do. 56 My rewrite of the Brady Act would
easily pass this test. A flat ban on gun sales would appear to
advance whatever aims Congress had in enacting the Brady
Act, albeit at a greater social cost. The suggested limit would
apparently condemn only .conditions wholly unrelated to the
aims of the statute. A rule invalidating such pretextual
conditions seems unobjectionable, if perhaps inadministrable
at the edges, but it places only weak limits on Congress. 57
Undoubtedly, the availability of conditional preemption is
in substantial tension with the functional justification the
Court gave in New York for the anticommandeering rule. 58
More broadly, the easy and cheap escape from· the
anticommandeering rule that conditional preemption makes
available is in tension with the whole thrust of the Court's
recent federalism decisions, as well as with the widespread

55. Id. at 924.
56. Id. at 925.
57. The Court has articulated a similar "nexus" requirement in the
Spending Clause context, but the requirement as enforced by the Court poses only
a very weak limit. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
58. As many have noted, if the problem with commandeering is that it blurs
the lines of accountability, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169
(1992), then it is difficult to explain why exercises of the Spending Clause,
conditional preemption, and indeed ordinary preemption are not also
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 37, at 1061-74; Hills, supra note
49, at 826-27; Jackson, supra note 45, at 2202; Mark V. Tushnet, Why the
Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1623,
1641-42 (1994).
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belief that New York and Printz were important decisions. 59
This area of the law has seen numerous doctrinal shifts in a
short period of time and, rather than accept defeat, the losing
side has tended to call for further reversals of course. 60 It
would thus not be surprising if the Court decided to cut back or
eliminate the conditional preemption doctrine. On the other
hand, a future Court could just as easily alleviate the tension
by overruling New York and Printz. Rather than speculate
about how this doctrine might evolve, this article considers
whether the anticommandeering doctrine as it currently stands
should be considered applicable to exercises of the treaty
power. This doctrine appears to permit a statute making the
performance of background checks by state officials a condition
of the sale of guns in a state. And it would permit a treaty
requiring state officials to notify aliens they arrest that they
have a right to consult with their consuls, but only if a treaty or
statute prohibiting the arrest of such aliens altogether would
be valid. It is to the latter question that I now turn.

II.

CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY
POWER

As noted, the Vienna Convention effectively gives state
officials a choice: they can either provide the required

59. But cf Jackson, supra note 45, at 2226-27 (suggesting that the
importance of the Court's recent federalism decisions is as a "cue" or "wake-up
call" to Congress that it should pay more attention to federalism). See also
PHILLIP BOBBI'IT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 190-95
(1982) (arguing that National League of Cities v. Usery served primarily a
"cueing" function); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the
Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1484 (1995) (arguing that Lopez was a "wake-up call" to
Congress).
60. For example, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), which in turn had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968). The dissenters in Garcia predicted that the principle aflirmed in National
League of Cities would "in time again command ... a majority of [the] Court."
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 589 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Similarly, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), and the
dissenters predicted that Seminole would not last long. Seminole, 517 U.S. at
1145 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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notification or they can refrain from arresting aliens. 61 This
treaty would be a valid exercise of conditional preemption only
if a treaty or statute prohibiting altogether the arrest of aliens
would be valid. 62 The answer to this question under current
doctrine appears to be simple: a treaty duly ratified by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate prohibiting
the arrest of aliens within our borders would be valid under
Missouri v. Holland. 63 Justice Holmes in that case suggested
that there might not be any substantive limits to the treaty
power. 64 This broad position has since been qualified by the
Court, and it is now well accepted that the federal government
cannot do by treaty what is affirmatively prohibited by the
Constitution. 65 It could not, for example, establish religion or
restrain the freedom of speech or of the press in violation of the
First Amendment. But the Court's holding in Missouri v.
Holland that the treaty power is not limited by any "invisible
radiation" from the Tenth Amendment has survived. 66 The
Court in Holland did say that the treaty before it addressed a
matter of the highest urgency which by its nature could only be
adequately addressed through treaty. 67 But surely the Court
did not mean to suggest that the treaty makers' judgment
about the urgency of the matter or the feasibility of addressing
it other than by treaty were proper subjects of judicial review. 68

61. State officials face this choice only when they arrest an alien from a
nation that is a party to the Vienna Convention. For simplicity's sake, I shall
refer in the text to aliens generally.
62. Given the existence of the Vienna Convention, a statute prohibiting
altogether the arrest of aliens would appear to be valid as necessary and proper to
implement the treaty. As we have seen, the treaty can be complied with if either
notice is given or no aliens are detained. In the absence of a power directly to
require the former, a statute requiring the latter would appear to be the secondbest way to achieve compliance with our international obligations. But this
analysis assumes the validity of a treaty that, by its terms, gives the states two
options, one of which (the obligation to notify) would arguably be unconstitutional
alone. If the anticommandeering principle applies to the treaty power, then this
treaty would be valid only if the other option would independently be valid.
Determining the validity of the Vienna Convention as conditional preemption
thus requires that we examine the validity of a hypothetical treaty that flatly bars
the arrest of aliens.
63. 252 u.s. 416 (1920).
64. See id. at 432-33.
65. See HENKIN, supra note 8.
66. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
67. See id. at 435.
68. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Other cases suggest that the treaty power extends only to
matters that have traditionally been regarded as the proper
subjects of negotiation among nations, or that are regarded as
appropriate subjects of treaties under internationallaw. 69 Be
that as it may, it is clear that the treatment of aliens has long
been regarded as an appropriate subject of negotiation between
the United States and the countries of which the aliens are
nationals. Treaties giving aliens certain rights date back to the
beginning of our history and have long been applied to the
states. 70 The validity of treaties giving aliens immunities from
civil suits or criminal prosecutions has never seriously been
questioned. 71
Recently, scholars have argued that the broad
understanding of the treaty power reflected in Missouri u.
Holland should be reconsidered. 72 In a recent article, Professor
Curtis Bradley has argued that the virtually unlimited treaty
power the Court recognized in Holland produces a loophole
permitting the circumvention of the limitations on the
commerce power the Court has recently embraced in such cases
as United States u. Lopez. 73 He accordingly suggests that the
treaty power be construed to extend only to those subjects over

69. See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 302 (1987).
70. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
71. The Vienna Convention itself gives foreign consuls some such
immunities, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 9, arts. 41, 43,
and other treaties give foreign diplomats and their families certain immunities.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 29, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Indeed, such immunities are conferred by statutes
and federal common law as well. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")
immunizes foreign states from suits in federal or state courts, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604,
1605 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), and defines "foreign state" in such a way as to
encompass foreign individuals in certain circumstances. See Chuidian v.
Phillippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 1990). Before the FSIA was
enacted, foreign sovereign immunity was regarded as a matter of federal common
law. See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 202-10 (3d ed. 1996). To the extent it is not governed by the
FSIA, the immunity of current and former heads of state continues to be governed
by federal common law. See id. at 284-85. These immunities of course bind
executive and well as judicial officers of the states.
72. Cf. Healy, supra note 11, at 1750-56 (stating that while recent
federalism cases could be read to limit treaty power, adoption of federalism-based
limits on treaty power would be unwise and unnecessary).
73. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 425-26.
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which Congress otherwise possesses legislative power. 74 My
own view is that the risk that the limits imposed by such cases
as Lopez would be circumvented through use of the treaty
power is overstated, given the requirement that treaties be
approved by two-thirds of the Senate. 75 Moreover, the limits
articulated in Lopez concern the extent of the commerce power
and thus have little apparent relevance to the scope of a wholly
separate head of federal power. 76 Any suggestion that the

74. See id. at 450. Bradley thus urges, in effect, that the treaty power be
construed as if the Bricker Amendment had been adopted.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. Bradley is legitimately concerned about the
opportunity for circumvention that would be available if the limitations reflected
in the Tenth Amendment were inapplicable to congressional-executive
agreements. But, rather than subject the treaty power to such limitations, I
would hold that congressional-executive agreements are subject to those limits, as
they are not "treaties" in the constitutional sense. This is not, of course, to say
that congressional-executive agreements such as NAFTA are not valid laws.
Compare Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 799 (1995) (concluding that they are valid), with Tribe, supra note 7
(concluding that they are not valid). See also David Golove, Against Free-Form
Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998) (a rejoinder to Tribe).
A problem not separately addressed by Bradley may be of greater concern:
often treaties express broad aspirations in precatory terms. To hold that such
broad, precatory provisions may support congressional legislation that would not
be within Congress's legislative power in the absence of the treaty seems
potentially problematic. But a response better tailored to this concern than
Bradley's would simply hold that Congress's power to implement treaties does not
encompass the power to enact legislation to implement clearly aspirational or
precatory treaty provisions. Whether this limitation is in fact warranted is a
subject for another day.
76. Professor Bradley may be constructing his theory around an
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment as reserving certain areas of regulation to
the states no matter what power Congress is purporting to exercise. But even the
Supreme Court opinions most protective of state sovereignty have not adopted
such an interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 & n.17 (1976) (stating that the limits
articulated in the case do not necessarily apply to exercises of the spending power
or the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); id. at 855 n.18 (stating that the limits
articulated in the case do not necessarily apply to exercises of the war power).
If the subject-matter limits the Constitution places on the legislative powers
enumerated in Article I and elsewhere do not apply to the treaty power, then the
very idea of "circumvention" of these limits by the treaty makers is problematic.
The treaty makers could not be accused of "circumventing" these limits just
because they have concluded a treaty on a matter falling outside the federal
legislative power, for these limits by hypothesis would not apply. On the other
hand, they would arguably be circumventing these limits if they concluded the
treaty solely or primarily to evade the constitutional limits on the federal
legislative power. If this is the nature of the circumvention claim, however, I
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treaty power authorizes only such treaties as would fall within
the commerce power if enacted by Congress would be
doctrinally implausible, as it would call into question the
validity of treaties which, like the Vienna Convention, impose
certain requirements regarding the treatment of aliens. While
certain obligations imposed by such treaties might fall within
the commerce power, other long-unquestioned provisions
common to treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
("FCN"), and other treaties, might not. For example, the
United States is party to treaties that undertake to provide
foreign military personnel certain immunities from the
criminal jurisdiction of the state and federal governments,77
and FCN treaties commonly prohibit discrimination against
aliens in noncommercial matters. 78

think the requirement that treaties be approved by two-thirds of the Senate
affords adequate protection.
My argument that the Constitution protects states from exorbitant exercises
of the treaty power structurally rather than through subject-matter limits should
not be understood as an endorsement of the position of the majority in Garcia that
the only protection the Constitution offers states from exercises of the federal
legislative power is the structural protection afforded by the "national political
process." 469 U.S. at 554, 555; see also Herbert Wecshler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Constitution
extends the federal legislative power to enumerated subjects, and this seems to
imply that other subjects are beyond the legislative power. If so, then the
Constitution appears to give a state the right to go its own way on those other
matters, no matter how large a majority of the other states wants to force it to toe
the line. The "national political process" does not protect that right. By contrast,
the Constitution does not enumerate the proper (or improper) subjects of treaties.
With respect to the treaty power, therefore, the claim that the Constitution
contemplates only a structural protection for the states is consistent with the
constitutional text.
77. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199
U.N.T.S. 67; Agreement Between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning the Application of Part
IV of the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
National Representatives and International Staff, Signed in Ottawa on September
20, 1951, to the Officials of NATO Civilian Bodies Located on the Territory of the
United States of America, Mar. 3, 1981, 33 U.S.T. 1272, 1307 U.N.T.S. 423.
78. For example, the FCN treaty with Japan in force at the turn of the
century, as interpreted both by the United States and Japanese governments,
prohibited discrimination against Japanese citizens with respect to education.
When the United States brought suit against school authorities of San Francisco
to enforce this treaty, the question whether the treaty exceeded the scope of the
treaty power was fully mooted. The story is told in ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE
TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 145-59, at
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In any event, Bradley suggests that the Constitution be
read to authorize treaties that would otherwise fall within any
of Congress's legislative powers, and those legislative powers
include the power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations, 79 to raise and support armies,80 to pass statutes
necessary and proper to effectuate the President's commanderin-chief power, 81 and even the nontextual "foreign affairs"
power, not to mention the war power. 82 Treaties that could not
be upheld as falling within the commerce power could well be
upheld as falling within one or more of those powers; but, if so,
it is unclear what is gained by the doctrinal change Professor
Bradley advocates. A rule that would uphold treaties under
the treaty power only if they also fell within one of Congress's
other legislative powers would put pressure on the
constitutional provisions delineating Congress's powers in the
foreign affairs area, shifting the debate to different ground
without materially advancing the analysis. 83 Those troubled by
142-89 (1908). The suit became moot when the school authorities withdrew the
offending resolution. See id. § 159, at 189. FCN treaties also commonly prohibit
discrimination with respect to criminal prosecutions. Education and criminal law
were both regarded by the Court in Lopez as areas traditionally reserved to the
states.
The FCN treaty concluded with Prussia in 1786 protected Prussian citizens
against state legislation denying freedom of conscience or religious worship, "and
when dying they were guaranteed the right of decent burial and undisturbed rest
for their bodies." Id. at 186 n.92 (quoting Mr. Bancroft Davis summarizing the
provisions of the treaty). The First Amendment would not be made applicable to
the states until after the Civil War, yet this treaty was declared in the
Constitution to be the "supreme Law of the Land." It is evidence that the
Founders did not regard the treaty power to be limited to matters falling within
Congress's legislative power under Article I.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.lO.
80. See id. cl. 12.
81. See id. cl. 18.
82. See id. cl. 11.
83. For example, perhaps a treaty iiiUp.unizing foreign military personnel
from the criminal jurisdiction of state and federal governments could be justified
under the power to raise and support armies, combined with the power to enact
laws necessary and proper to implement the President's commander-in-chief
power, on the ground that the reciprocal undertaking by foreign states helps
protect our military abroad. One might justify under the same provisions a treaty
undertaking to protect the human rights of our nationals on the theory that the
reciprocal promise by other parties might help forestall international crises such
as those in Kosovo, Bosnia, or Somalia that might call for action on the part of the
United States military that might endanger the safety of our troops.
Alternatively, one might say that prohibiting states from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over foreign military is a valid exercise of the power to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations. But if the powers of Congress in the
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"treaty power exceptionalism," as Professor Bradley is, 84 should
be even more troubled by "foreign affairs exceptionalism," as
the latter, unlike the former, gives exceptional powers to
Congress as well as the treaty makers, and ordinary legislation
does not require the concurrence of a supermajority.
The fact is that the power to make treaties is not just the
power to make laws on the same subjects by other means; it is
the power to make laws on subjects not otherwise falling within
Congress's legislative power. One subject that has long been
regarded as within the treaty-making power, but in certain
contexts might not fall within the legislative power in the
absence of a treaty, is the treatment of aliens within the United
States. The narrowest and least controversial ground on which
to uphold treaties addressing the treatment of aliens would be
that this subject has always been regarded as an appropriate
one for negotiation among nations. For that very reason, a
proposed limitation on the treaty power that would disable the
federal government from entering into such treaties is not an
eligible interpretation of the Constitution.
Although a treaty addressing the treatment of aliens
would clearly fall within the scope of the treaty power as
traditionally construed, other sorts of treaties might be
vulnerable if the test of the scope of the treaty-making power
were tradition. Specifically, treaties limiting the discretion of
states-parties with respect to the treatment of their own
citizens are an innovation of the post-World War II era, and
some such treaties include notification provisions similar to
that of the Vienna Convention. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, ·for example, requires that certain
information be given to all persons arrested by the state. 85

area of foreign affairs would support the treaties that under Bradley's thesis the
treaty power alone would not support, then the suggested analysis imposes no
substantive limitation at all.
84. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 394.
85. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 9(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. It is likely that this provision requires no more than
what our Constitution independently requires. If so, the question whether the
provision violates the anticommandeering principle is academic.
It is
nevertheless worth discussing the issue, as human rights treaties could in theory
seek to require notifications going beyond constitutional requirements. For
similar reasons, I shall disregard for the time being the reservations,
understandings, and declarations the United States attached to its ratification of
this treaty.
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Upholding such a treaty under a conditional preemption theory
would require the conclusion that a treaty prohibiting states
from arresting any person would be valid. Such a treaty would
no doubt be politically and practically problematic, and for that
very reason we can be confident that the President and Senate
would not agree to it. But, if it were made, would it be
unconstitutional? It could perhaps be argued that a treaty may
not constitutionally regulate a state's treatment of its own
citizens because that has not traditionally been regarded as a
proper subject of negotiation with other nations. On the other
hand, the treaty power may be said to embrace whatever
subjects the international community at any given time
regards as a proper subject for negotiation among nations, and
today international law clearly addresses a state's treatment of
its own citizens. On this issue, I find myself in agreement with
Professor Bradley, who agrees with Professor Louis Henkin
that the first interpretation would be highly undesirable and is
unsupported by the Framers' intent. 86
At any rate, unless Missouri u. Holland is reconsidered, it
appears that there are no limits on the treaty power grounded
in state sovereignty.
The states' sole protection from
exorbitant exercises of the treaty power is the structural
requirement that treaties receive the consent of two-thirds of
the Senate. The federal government thus appears to be even
less constrained in its ability to use conditional preemption in
treaties than in statutes. 87

86. See Bradley, supra note 8, at 451-52 (citing Louis Henkin, The
Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012,
1021 (1968)). Bradley also rejects the suggestion that the treaty power be limited
to matters "international" on the ground that today "almost any issue can
plausibly be labeled 'international."' !d. Of course, as discussed above, the
recognition that in today's world almost everything has international
ramifications may equally justify the conclusion that almost anything can be
supported by the federal government's commander-in-chief or foreign affairs
powers. See supra note 83.
87. It is admittedly strange to rely on the constitutionality of a treaty the
federal government did not and never would conclude as support for the
conclusion that a different treaty the government did conclude would be
constitutional, particularly when the constitutionality of the hypothetical treaty
rests on the existence of structural protections that virtually guarantee that it
will never be agreed to. This problem, however, inheres in any doctrine that
rests, as the conditional preemption doctrine does, on the argument that a greater
power includes a lesser one.
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COMMANDEERING VS. PREEMPTION

There is another possible problem with the conditional
preemption rationale for upholding the consular notification
provision: there is some basis for concluding that a treaty
barring states from arresting aliens would violate the
anticommandeering principle itself. According to some courts
and commentators, Printz and New York invalidate any federal
statute that imposes obligations on states without also
imposing them on private parties, or regulates states in their
governmental roles. If so, then a statute prohibiting the arrest
of aliens, unlike a statute imposing a ban on the sale of guns,
would be invalid. I conclude that, if Printz and New York were
so construed, then the anticommandeering principle cannot
limit the treaty power. But I also conclude that these broad
interpretations are implausible even in the purely domestic,
nontreaty context.
The precise scope of the anticommandeering principle
embraced in New York and Printz is currently a matter of some
disagreement among the federal courts. New York involved a
provision requiring the state affirmatively to regulate the
activities of private parties according to federal standards.
Printz involved an obligation to perform affirmative acts in
administering a federal scheme governing the rights and
liabilities of private parties. One might thus conclude that the
federal government "commandeers" state officials only when it
compels them to perform affirmative acts, such as conducting
background checks or notifying aliens of their right to consult
with their consuls. On this view, the anticommandeering
principle does not reach a federal obligation not to do
something, such as the obligation not to detain aliens from
certain countries.
On the other hand, the Court in New York distinguished
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,88 among
other cases, on the ground that they involved federal statutes
that imposed the same obligations on states as on private
parties, 89 and the Court in Printz acknowledged that
88. 469 u.s. 528 (1985).
89. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992). The majority
opinion in Garcia noted that the statute placed the same obligation on public and
private employers, 469 U.S. at 554, but it did not make much of that fact. Justice
Blackmun's original draft of the Garcia decision, however, apparently would have
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distinction. 90 This may suggest that Congress has the power to
impose obligations on states, even of a prohibitory character,
only if it also imposes the obligation on private parties. 91 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
Condon v. Reno,92 adopted this interpretation of Printz and
New York, and accordingly struck down a federal statute, the
Drivers' Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), which prohibits
states from revealing in certain circumstances information
received on drivers' license applications, on the ground that the
statute does not impose the same prohibition on private
databases. 93 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has struck down the DPPA on similar
grounds. 94 Though these holdings extend Printz and New York
beyond what the term "commandeering'' seems to denote, they
are supported not just by the Court's distinction of Garcia and
similar cases in New York and Printz, and by the difficulty of
distinguishing affirmative from negative obligations, but also
by the Court's suggestion in New York that a statute requiring
the state to take title to radioactive waste, standing alone,
would violate the anticommandeering principle. Such a statute
would address only the conduct of states and would not directly
require affirmative acts. 95

established this as the test of the constitutionality of federal statutes regulating
states. See Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1629.
90. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930-31 (1997).
91. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Earthrights International Supporting the
Appeal of Defendants/Appellants Laskey and Anderson Urging Reversal at 9,
National Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, No. 98-2304 (1st Cir. filed Feb. 5, 1999)
("The Tenth Amendment . . . frowns upon laws that seek to regulate States
without applying identical restrictions to private parties.").
92. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, Mar. 15, 1999 (No.
98-1464).
93. See id.
94. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6262, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. Apr. 6,
1999). The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has upheld the DPPA. See United
States v. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d 1266 (lOth Cir. 1998). In these cases, the federal
government appears not to have pressed the argument that Printz does not apply
to prohibitory statutes. But cf Pryor, 1999 WL 187050, at *4 n.5 (referring to,
and rejecting as inaccurate, "the United States' argument that the Act does not
command the States to do anything because the States may simply opt out of this
legislation by deciding to close their DMV records completely"). It stressed
instead that the DPPA does not require the states to regulate private parties in a
given manner (which Printz bars), but rather regulates the states directly (which
Printz permits). See, e.g., Condon, 155 F.3d at 461. It is unclear how our
hypothetical statute barring the arrest of all aliens would fare under such a test.
95. See Caminker, supra note 20, at 235-36.
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In Travis v. Reno, 96 the Seventh Circuit upheld the DPPA,
but there is less difference than meets the eye between its
interpretation of Printz and New York and that of the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
DPPA was constitutional because (1) it "affects states as
owners of databases; it does not affect them in their role as
governments,"97 and (2) the burdens imposed on states by the
DPPA are not significantly greater than those imposed on
private databases by other federal statutes governing similar
matters. 98 Thus, a federal statute would presumably violate
the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Printz and New York if
it either affected the states in their role as governments or
imposed on states significantly greater burdens than federal
law imposes on private parties engaging in similar conduct.
A statute prohibiting states from arresting aliens would
appear to violate the tests articulated by these courts. It would
violate the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' test because it does
not also regulate private parties. It may satisfy the second
prong of the Seventh Circuit's test, since other rules of law
place significant limits on the power of private parties to arrest
aliens, 99 but for that very reason it would fail the first prong.
Private parties have only limited authority to arrest aliens
because arresting people is a function of government. Because
a treaty prohibiting the arrest of aliens would affect the states
"in their role as governments," the statute would be invalid
under the Seventh Circuit's reading of Printz and New York.
If Printz and New York condemn all laws placing
obligations on states that are not also imposed on private
parties, or affecting the states in their role as governments,
subjecting the treaty power to this limitation would be highly
problematic. Unlike the Constitution, federal statutes often
address the conduct of private parties, and when they do
impose obligations on states they often impose on them the
same obligations they impose on private parties. Thus, while
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits' interpretations of Printz may

96. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
97. Id. at 1004. The Eleventh Circuit, too, stressed that the DPPA regulated
"an exercise of sovereignty." Pryor, 1999 WL 187050, at *6.
98. See id. at 1005-06.
99. The second prong may not be satisfied because the limits on the power of
private parties to arrest aliens have their source in state law. Even if this prong
were satisfied, however, the first would not be.
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be problematic with respect to statutes, at least those
interpretations would reach only the atypical statute. Treaties,
however, resemble the Constitution in this respect more than
they resemble statutes. As a general matter, treaties address
the rights and obligations of governments vis-a-vis each other,
and they typically apply to state action. The ratification
debates on which the Court relied in New York to show that the
Framers contemplated a regime in which the federal
government would act directly on individuals are particularly
instructive on this question. As Justice O'Connor explained,
the Framers regarded the regime set up by the Articles of
Confederation to be ineffective because the Articles gave the
federal government the power to act only upon the states as
political bodies; the Constitution, on the other hand, gave the
federal government the power to act directly upon
individuals. 100 What is important for present purposes is the
Framers' description of the regime they rejected, the one
permitting the government to act only on states, as a "treaty"
regime. 101 The Framers thus recognized that treaties, unlike
statutes, generally do not impose duties directly on private
individuals. Even when a treaty's ultimate object is the
protection or regulation of individuals, it typically accomplishes
that goal by placing obligations, whether of an affirmative or
negative character, on the states-parties. When the obligation
is of a negative character, moreover, it presumptively applies to
governmental actors in the states-parties at alllevels. 102 Thus,
an anticommandeering rule that bars the imposition of
obligations on states that are not also imposed on private
individuals would invalidate the typical rather than the odd
treaty. The same would be true of a rule barring treaties that
affect states "in their role as governments." Accordingly,
neither rule could plausibly apply to the treaty power.
Supreme Court decisions upholding treaties of this nature
without so much as hinting at a Tenth Amendment problem
confirm that, if the anticommandeering principle is indeed that
broad, it does not apply to the treaty power. For example, in

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-65 (1992).
See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and
Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1097-1101 (1992).
102. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
100.
101.

INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (7th rev. ed. 1996).
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Asakura v. Seattle, 103 the Court gave effect to a provision of an
FCN treaty with Japan providing that "[t]he citizens or
subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have
liberty to ... carry on trade ... upon the same terms as native
citizens or subjects." 104 Relying on this treaty, the Court held
that a Seattle ordinance making noncitizens ineligible for
pawnbroker licenses could not validly be applied to Japanese
citizens. 105 The Court effectively interpreted the treaty to
require Seattle to issue licenses to Japanese citizens as long as
it issued licenses to United States citizens, and upon the same
terms. (The treaty-based prohibition thus required the state to
perform affirmative acts-evaluate the license applications of
Japanese citizens-that they wo-uld not have had to perform in
the absence of the treaty.) 106 This is just one of many treaties
given effect by the Supreme Court that affected the states in
their role as governments and placed obligations on state
actors without also placing them on private actors.
Interpreting the anticommandeering principle of New York and
Printz to invalidate such obligations would thus require the
rejection of numerous treaty precedents. Since the Court in
Printz regarded the absence of contrary precedents as a reason
for extending the holding of New York to statutes that
commandeer executive officials, 107 it seems safe to say that, if
the anticommandeering principle would invalidate federal laws
affecting states in their role as governments or placing
obligations on states but not private parties, then the
anticommandeering principle does not apply to exercises of the
treaty power.
Indeed, the doctrinal case for the broad interpretations of
Printz and New York just discussed seems weak even outside
the treaty context. The Supreme Court has long recognized,
albeit largely in what is arguably dicta, that Congress has the
power to enact laws addressing solely the governmental
103. 265 u.s. 332 (1923).
104. Id. at 340 (quoting Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911,
U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504).
105. See id. at 341-42.
106. Today, this nondiscrimination obligation is required by the
Constitution, but at the time the Equal Protection Clause had not been
interpreted to apply to aliens. The plaintiff in Asakura raised a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, see id. at 340, but the Court chose to resolve the case on the
basis of the treaty.
107. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907-09 (1997).
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activities of states. In dormant Commerce Clause cases, for
example, the Court has long made clear that Congress has the
power to enact legislation allowing state regulation that would
otherwise run afoul of the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, 108 or to strike down state legislation that it
regards as prejudicial to the national interest in free interstate
commerce, even if the statute does not violate the Commerce
Clause in its self-executing operation. 109 In Barclays Bank PLC
v. Franchise Tax Board, 110 the Court upheld California's
"worldwide combined reporting'' method of determining the
amount of tax owed by certain corporate groups against a
challenge based on the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause,
relying in part on the fact that Congress had long been aware
of California's approach and had declined to enact a law
prohibiting it. The Court's express recognition that Congress
has the power to prohibit states from using this method of
taxation rebuts the claim that Congress lacks the power to
regulate states in their role as governments or to impose
negative obligations on the states that do not also apply to
private parties. Private parties, after all, do not engage in
taxation. Similarly, it is well accepted that Congress has the
power simply to bar state regulation in a particular field of
commerce without supplying an alternative federal regulatory
scheme. Such a statute does nothing more than prohibit state
regulation, in apparent violation of the broad interpretations of
Printz and New York. 111 Even in the statutory context,
therefore, Printz and New York cannot plausibly be construed
to invalidate all federal laws that affect states in their

108. The second incentive upheld in New York was upheld as a conditional
exercise of Congress's power to approve state action that otherwise would have
been barred by the dormant Commerce Clause. See New York v. United States,
505 u.s. 144, 173-74 (1992).
109. Indeed, Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Printz,
would, in the absence of stare decisis concerns, replace entirely the Court's
practice of striking down state statutes on dormant Commerce Clause grounds
with a congressional power to invalidate state statutes that, in its vj.ew,
contravene the national interest in a free market. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v.
Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring & dissenting).
110. 512 u.s. 298 (1994).
111. See Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1641-42.
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governmental roles or impose obligations on the states that
they do not also impose on private individuals. 112
IV. PRINTZ AND THE TREATY POWER

If Printz and New York do not invalidate all federal
statutes imposing obligations on states without also imposing
them on private individuals, or affecting states in their role as
governments, then what is the scope of the anticommandeering
principle? Without answering that question, it is impossible to
reach firm conclusions about Printz's applicability to the treaty
power.
There are a number of possible answers. First, Printz and
New York may invalidate only federal statutes that impose on
state legislatures or executive officials the obligation to act
affirmatively to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
scheme. On this view, federal statutes that merely prohibit
conduct by the states would not violate the anticommandeering
principle, even if the prohibition did not apply to private
parties. As we have seen, it is notoriously difficult to draw the
line between affirmative and negative obligations. Should the
treaty obligation at issue in Asakura, for instance, be regarded
as merely the negative obligation not to discriminate against
Japanese citizens, or should it be regarded as the affirmative
obligation to give Japanese citizens the same rights as United
States citizens? 113 On the other hand, a distinction between

112. See also Matthew Schaefer, Twenty-First-Century Trade Negotiations,
the US Constitution, and the Elimination of US State-Level Protectionism, 2 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 1, 20-29 (1999) (describing provisions of congressional-executive
agreements that would be called into question by the broad interpretation of
Printz and New York under discussion here, and citing additional nontreaty case
law that calls into question that broad interpretation).
113. The United States defended the constitutionality of a similar
nondiscrimination obligation against a challenge based on the Tenth Amendment
on the ground that the treaty was merely prohibitory:
It was not contended that the state was obligated to supply education,
but that if a state did choose to supply education as a governmental
function, it could not discriminate, and that while the state was at
liberty to maintain a school system or not, yet if it did provide such a
school system, the schools of which alien children generally were
permitted to attend, it could not exclude the alien children of any
particular nation enjoying treaty rights. In other words, the provision of
the treaty placed no obligation upon the state, was in no sense
compulsory, but was negative and prohibitory.
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affirmative and negative obligations is supported by the
Court's description of "commandeering'' as the "administ[ration
of] a federal regulatory program"114-indeed, by the very term
"commandeering." Recognition of the federal government's
power to preempt state law appears to require that at least
some negative obligations be exempted from the
anticommandeering principle, as state officials are undoubtedly
subject to the obligation not to enforce state laws that conflict
with federal laws regulating private conduct, or to interfere
with federal officers enforcing such laws. 115 If New York and
Printz contemplate such a distinction, however, an obligation
could not be counted as affirmative merely because a state
would have to take affirmative preparatory steps to ensure that
its officers comply with a legal prohibition. 116
Alternatively, New York and Printz might be construed to
prohibit federal statutes that impose even negative obligations
on states, but only if the statutes do not impose the same
prohibition on the federal government. 117 This would modify

DEVLIN, supra note 78, § 150, at 162-64.

114. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see also Travis v.
Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[S)tates cannot be compelled to
become regulators of private conduct.").
115. The majority in Printz recognized the latter obligation. See Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997).
116. Even if a nondiscrimination obligation were regarded as affirmative,
such a treaty provision could perhaps be upheld as an exercise of conditional
preemption: the state is given a choice between treating aliens equally or
withdrawing from the field. The treaty in Asakura, for example, might be
understood to give Seattle the choice between granting licenses to Japanese
citizens and withdrawing from the regulation of the pawnbroker business. It is
noteworthy that this analysis would validate nondiscrimination provisions only if
Missouri v. Holland survived in all its breadth. The federal government no doubt
has the power to require the states to withdraw from the regulation of
pawnbroker businesses under the Commerce Clause, but treaties prohibit
discrimination in noncommercial areas traditionally regulated by the states, such
as education, see supra note 78, and such treaties would no doubt be valid even if
the Equal Protection Clause did not independently prohibit discrimination in
those areas. The conditional preemption doctrine would validate a treaty barring
discrimination in education, however, only if we accepted that a treaty barring the
states from regulating education would be valid. The United States has advanced
precisely that argument. See supra note 113.
117. Cf Jackson, supra note 45, at 2208 n.126 (noting that "Solicitor
General Bork's argument in support of the FLSA in National League of Cities ...
suggested that Congress was constrained by a requirement for such equivalency");
see also Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1649 (suggesting this argument as a basis for
upholding a federal statute struck down by the Ninth Circuit on the basis of New
York).
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only slightly the Court's reason for distinguishing Garcia and
similar cases. Rather than distinguish these cases as involving
statutes that impose on states the same obligations they
impose on private parties, the Court could distinguish them on
the ground that they do not single out the states for regulation.
A statute that regulates functions performed only by
governments, such as taxation, does not single out states for
regulation if the statute imposes the same obligation on the
federal government. 118
Either of the foregoing narrow interpretations of Printz
would meet the objections identified above to applying the
anticommandeering rule to the treaty power. The main
problem with applying Printz to the treaty power is that
negative obligations imposed by treaties typically (1) apply only
to governmental actors and (2) apply to governmental actors at
all levels.
An interpretation of the anticommandeering
principle that disabled the federal government from placing
negative obligations on states unless it imposed the same
obligations on private individuals would accordingly severely
Limiting Printz to affirmative
limit the treaty power.
obligations would largely eliminate this problem, so long as
"affirmative" were defined narrowly. Treaties do sometimes
impose affirmative obligations on states-parties of a sort
analogous to that involved in the Printz case, but exempting
the states from such obligations is problematic only when the
required affirmative acts are triggered by, or otherwise
connected to, activities that states are already performing.
Again, this problem would disappear if the federal government
retained the power to impose negative obligations on the
states. The federal government would then have the power to
give the states a choice between (1) not performing the
triggering act and (2) performing the triggering act and
complying with the triggered obligation. Nor would the treaty
power be significantly obstructed by a rule tying the federal
government's power to impose negative obligations on the
states to its willingness to assume the obligations itself, for,
like the nondiscrimination provision involved in Asakura and

118. Perhaps some combination of the above would be acceptable: states
cannot be compelled affirmatively to enforce a federal regulatory scheme, and
they can be subjected to negative obligations only if the same obligations are
imposed on similarly situated private parties or on the federal government.
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the consular notification provision involved in Breard, most
treaties that impose negative or conditional obligations impose
the same obligations on state and federal governments. 119
When a treaty imposes an obligation to perform
affirmative acts and the obligation is not triggered by or
otherwise connected to governmental activities the states are
currently carrying out, an interpretation of Printz as barring
the federal government from requiring the states to perform
those acts appears to pose no special difficulties. To the extent
the treaty contemplates such affirmative acts of executive
officials, there will usually be no question that the relevant
acts are to be performed by federal officials. As a matter of
international law, there would be no obstacle to assigning such
obligations to state officials. Disabling the federal government
from doing so as a matter of domestic constitutional law might
perhaps be undesirable, but not more so in the treaty context
than in the purely domestic context. 120
With respect to treaties that require affirmative acts of a
legislative nature, the narrow interpretation of New York and
Printz has considerable appeal.
Treaties that require
affirmative acts of legislation have a long history. They are
known as non-self-executing treaties. One of the principal
problems with the Articles of Confederation was that states
were violating federal treaties and the federal government
lacked the power to compel compliance or remedy violations. 121
This problem was caused in part by the courts' adherence to
the British rule, under which treaties did not have direct effect
as domestic law, but always had to be incorporated into
domestic law through legislation. While state courts applying

119. Such a limitation would, however, call into question provisions of
nontreaty international agreements that have been given domestic effect through
legislation. See Schaefer, supra note 112, at 23-29.
120. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Printz noted some benefits that
might be gained from such commandeering. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78
(Breyer, J., dissenting). For example, it may be more efficient to require state
officials to do certain things than to establish a whole new federal bureaucracy for
the purpose. See id. at 977. This would appear to be true, however, only if what
we want the state officers to do is related to something they are already doing. If
so, then the federal government's ability to give the states a choice between doing
the new thing or being barred from doing the old thing should eliminate the
problem.
121. See generally Vazquez, supra note 101; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The
"Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee Protocol's Non-Refoulement Obligation,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993).

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1353 1999

1354

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

the British rule were refusing to give effect to treaties directly,
state legislatures were failing to pass the required legislation
and the federal government lacked the power to do so. The
Founders corrected this problem by making treaties the
"supreme Law of the Land" and thus enforceable by the courts
without the need for intervening acts of legislation. 122 Despite
this history, United States courts have long recognized a
category of treaty that is not directly enforceable by judges or
other domestic-law-applying officials without implementing
legislation. The circumstances in which a treaty is properly
held to be non-self-executing need not be examined here. 123 For
present purposes what is important is that the power to
implement non-self-executing treaties has always been thought
to reside in the federal government.
To apply the
anticommandeering principle to the treaty power would be to
hold that the federal government not only has the power to
implement non-self-executing treaties, but also, as a
constitutional matter, the sole and exclusive duty to do so-a
duty that may not be delegated to the states. 124
Perhaps ironically, applying Printz and New York to the
treaty power would call into question the constitutionality of
the policy · reflected in the so-called "federalism"
understandings the United States has recently attached to the
122. See generally Vazquez, supra note 101, at 1101-14.
123. On this question, see generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
124. In which branches of the federal government this duty resides is of
course a different question. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding Congress's power to delegate to the President in
the area of foreign affairs even if a similar delegation would be unconstitutional in
the purely domestic area).
If a treaty is not self-executing, the federal government has a duty to enact
legislation if the treaty requires domestic-law-applying officials to do or not to do
certain things and existing law does not impose such a requirement on such
officials. Curtis Bradley has suggested to me that, while there may be a duty
under international law to enact legislation, it does not follow that there is a duty
to do so under domestic law. I admit that a federal duty to enact legislation is one
that cannot be judicially enforced, as Congress cannot be made a defendant before
a court. See also Printz, 521 U.S. at 975 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he essence of
legislative power, within the limits of legislative jurisdiction, is a discretion not
subject to command."). I am also sympathetic to the claim that a judicially
unenforceable duty is not a legal duty at all. See Vazquez, supra note 101, at
1089-91. Nevertheless, the Constitution designates "all" treaties of the United
States as the "supreme Law of the Land," and thus appears to rule out the claim
that a treaty that requires implementing legislation does not impose a domesticlaw duty to enact such legislation.
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human rights treaties it has ratified. The. understanding
attached to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is typical:
[T]he United States' understands that this Covenant shall
be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent
that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and
local governments; to the extent that state and local
governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of
the state or local governments may take appropriate
measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant. 125

The intended purpose of this understanding is a matter of some
uncertainty. Among the other reservations, understandings,
and declarations ("RUDs") attached to these treaties is one
declaring the treaties to be non-self-executing. Still other
RUDs purport to limit the substantive obligations undertaken
by the United States pursuant to these treaties so that, in the
end, the treaties require no more than what our domestic
Constitution independently requires. As commentators have
pointed out, however, notwithstanding the reservations,
discrepancies remain between these treaties and our domestic
laws. 126 To the extent discrepancies exist, the non-selfexecuting declaration (assuming it is binding and effective)
means that the treaty does not itself preempt inconsistent
laws, but instead requires implementing legislation. The
federalism understanding, in turn, appears to provide that, in
certain circumstances, the responsibility for passing the
required legislation will be shouldered by the states rather
than the federal government. The understanding does not
appear to be designed merely to notify other parties that
certain matters are beyond the federal government's power
under our Constitution. If Missouri v. Holland is still good law,
the federal government has the power to implement these
treaties to the extent they do not contravene the affirmative

125. 138 CONG REC. 84781, 84784 (1992) (setting out the understandings
which apply to the obligations of the United States under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
126. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 50-51.
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prohibitions of the Constitution.
The authors of the
understanding appear to recognize this by stating that the
treaties shall be implemented by the United States only insofar
as it "exercises" jurisdiction over the relevant matters.
Through this understanding, the federal government seems to
be saying that, even though it possesses legislative power to
implement the treaty, it does not intend to exercise that power
unless it has already legislated over the subject matter. This
understanding, of course, does not diminish in the slightest the
United States's obligation under international law to pass the
required legislation, 127 and under international law it is a
matter of indifference whether the required legislation is
passed by the federal government or by the fifty states
separately. Thus, the federalism understanding, alongside the
non-self-executing declaration, appears to commandeer state
legislatures to pass the laws the treaty requires. Such a
requirement is something even dissenters in Printz regarded as
unconstitutional. 128
Professor Gerald Neuman has noted the tension between
the anticommandeering principle and the federalism
understandings, but concludes that "this observation may
illustrate the inapplicability of New York v. United States to
exercises of the treaty power, and the weakness of the evidence
for the anticommandeering principle in general." 129 I do not
agree. The evidence for the anticommandeering principle may
in fact be weak, 130 particularly as applied to commandeering of
executive officials, 131 but the practice of attaching federalism
understandings to human rights treaties does not strengthen
the case against the principle. First, this practice is too recent
to have any value ·as evidence of the Framers' intent, or
otherwise to receive deference because of its pedigree. Second,
the accountability concerns that led the Court in New York and

127. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 346 (1995).
128. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 970-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
129. Neuman, supra note 7, at 52 (footnote omitted).
130. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?,
106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1781-82 (1997).
131. In addition to the articles by Professor Caminker already cited, see
supra notes 20, 37, see, for example, Jackson, supra note 45; Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993); Martin
Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?: Federal Power us. "States' Rights" in Foreign
Affairs, 70 U.COLO. L. REV. 1277 (1999). But see Hills, supra note 49, at 831-55.
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Printz to prohibit the federal government from commandeering
state legislatures seem equally relevant in the treaty context.
Treaty adherence offers certain benefits under international
law. Indeed, the federal government maintains that its
purpose in adhering to human rights treaties is not to produce
any changes domestically, so much as to attain international
standing to complain of other nations' violations. 132 If the
federalism understanding imposes on the states the duty to
pass the laws the treaty contemplates, it permits the federal
government to reap the international benefits while shunting
to the states the domestic political costs. 133 If the federal
government through treaty makes an international
undertaking on the part of the Untied States, it seems only
right that any legislative action required by the treaty-and
any political heat that results-be taken by the federal
government.
Perhaps the federalism understanding can be saved from a
challenge based on the New York and Printz cases on the
ground that, unlike the obligation imposed on state executive
officials by the Brady Act or the obligation imposed on state
legislatures by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Amendments
Act, the states' obligation to pass legislation to implement
these human rights treaties is not backed by any sanction for
noncompliance. If this argument were accepted, though, it
would be because the absence of a sanction renders the
domestic law "duty" to pass legislation effectively precatory.
This may in fact be the intent behind the federalism
understanding, which would explain why the understanding is
widely regarded as benefiting rather than burdening the
states. 134 But if the purpose of this understanding is to make
132. See David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1993). Such a purpose is neither
unusual nor objectionable. It is generally the case that nations undertake
international obligations through treaty only because of the benefits they stand to
gain from the reciprocal undertakings of the other states-parties. What would be
objectionable would be the failure to take seriously the obligations undertaken in
exchange for those taken on by one's treaty partners.
133. This dynamic was evident in another aspect of the Breard episode. See
Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power, supra note 4, at 690.
134. Alternatively, the federalism understanding, though imposing a
mandatory obligation on the states to pass legislation, might be regarded as
preferable to the states than outright federal preemption because at least it leaves
to the states some discretion as to the particular form the required legislation will
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compliance with these treaties ultimately a matter of the
states' option, then the resulting regime is in deep tension with
our constitutional scheme. The Founders made treaties the
law of the land because they valued treaty compliance and they
understood that if compliance were left to the individual states,
as it was under the Articles of Confederation, then compliance
would be haphazard at best. If the treaties containing the
federalism understandings do not violate the commandeering
prohibition because they do not command, but merely request,
action on the part of the states, then for that very reason the
understandings are highly problematic. As a matter of
international law, the treaties impose obligations; they do not
just make requests.
In any event, it is far from clear that the absence of a
sanction would save the understanding. The Court has not
elaborated the distinction between laws that commandeer and
laws that merely request cooperation. Although the presence
of a sanction clearly places a statute in the former category, 135
it does not follow that the absence of one places a statute in the
latter. To hold that it does would reflect a rather unflattering
opinion of the characters of state executive and legislative
officers, an opinion that seems uncharacteristic of the Justices
in the majority in recent federalism decisions. If the Court
instead regards as noncommandeering only statutes that
expressly state that the contemplated conduct is optional, then
the federalism understandings would appear to be invalid. 136
It may seem ironic that a doctrine designed to protect the
states' sovereignty results in the invalidation of a provision
apparently designed for their benefit, but this sort of irony

take. This, however, would not distinguish the federal obligation imposed by
these treaties from that imposed by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Amendments Act, which likewise left the states with much discretion.
135. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
136. The absence of a sanction would certainly reduce the likelihood that a
state would ever seek a judicial declaration that it is not required to enact the
legislation. If it did obtain such a declaration, moreover, the end result would be
the same as the result the understanding seeks to produce, as neither the states
nor any individual would be able to maintain an action in the courts to require the
federal government to enact the required legislation. See supra note 124. For this
reason, the understanding's incompatibility with New York's anticommandeering
principle may be relevant only to a conscientious president or senator-{)ne who
takes seriously constitutional limitations on the treaty power without regard to
their possible enforcement by the courts. This is not the same, however, as saying
that the conflict is irrelevant (at least one hopes).
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pervades the anticommandeering doctrine. As Justice Breyer
noted in his dissenting opinion in Printz, the federal
government's inability to commandeer may paradoxically
result in the creation of an unwieldy federal bureaucracy more
threatening to the states. 137
Indeed, the conditional
preemption doctrine itself reflects the irony that the federal
government retains powers far more threatening to states than
that of commandeering their officials. It is noteworthy in this
connection that the Founders gave the federal government the
power to commandeer the state courts to enforce federal law
because those concerned with protecting state sovereignty
viewed this option as less threatening to the states than the
creation of a battery of federal trial courts to enforce federal
laws throughout the nation. 138 On the other hand, those who
objected to commandeering of state officials were animated by
a profound distrust of state officials' willingness and ability to
enforce federal law faithfully. 139 This history may call into
question the correctness of the holdings in New York and
Printz/ 40 but it also suggests that, as long as those decisions
stand, we should not be surprised that it operates to invalidate
some provisions regarded as desirable by defenders of state
interests.
CONCLUSION

Whether the anticommandeering principle articulated in
New York ·and Printz applies to exercises of the treaty power

137. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
138. The principal disagreement at the Convention concerning the federal
courts was between the nationalists, who wanted to create lower federal courts to
enforce federal law, and the defenders of states' rights, who wanted to rely on the
state courts to enforce federal laws, subject to Supreme Court review-in essence
a species of commandeering. Under the Madisonian Compromise, Congress was
given the power, but not the duty, to create lower federal courts, and state judges
were instructed in the Supremacy Clause to enforce federal laws. See generally
RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-9 (4th ed. 1996). Thus, the current system, which relies on
federal commandeering of state judges, reflects the victory on this point of the
defenders of states' interests over the nationalists.
139. See Hills, supra note 49, at 818.
140. But cf id. at 855-916 (defending anticommandeering principle on
functional grounds while acknowledging that the historical support for the
principle reflected nationalist sentiment).
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depends on the scope of that principle. If those decisions
invalidate federal laws that affect states "in their role as
governments" or that impose obligations on states without
imposing them on private parties, their holdings cannot be
applicable to treaties. Such a rule would invalidate the typical
treaty, including some that have been upheld by the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, a narrower interpretation of the
anticommandeering principle-one that, for example,
invalidates laws placing affirmative but not negative
obligations, or laws that impose obligations on the states'
governmental activities without placing similar obligations on
the federal government-could unproblematically be applied to
exercises of the treaty power, as long as the Court continued to
recognize a broad power of conditional preemption. Treaties
that impose affirmative obligations on states in connection with
functions or activities they are already undertaking could then
be upheld as giving the states a choice between complying with
the obligation and withdrawing from the activity. As long as
Missouri v. Holland remains good law, the federal
government's power to impose that choice on the states will be
virtually plenary. Whether the broad or narrow understanding
of the anticommandeering principle were adopted, the Vienna
Convention's consular notification provision would be valid, as
would any treaty placing obligations on states in connection
with functions they undertake as governments. 141

141. If the broad understanding were adopted, the Vienna Convention would
be valid because Printz would not be applicable to the treaty power. If the narrow
interpretation were adopted, the Vienna Convention would be valid as conditional
preemption.
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